Must Noachides believe in God?

The Torah’s opening parshiyot contain several divine instructions, within which the Gemara finds references to the Seven Noachide commandments. In some of my recent reading – possibly in preparation for a follow-up volume to Judaism Reclaimed – I came across an interesting discussion as to the nature and function of these Noachide Laws.

On the one hand these laws, which govern basic human interactions and societal cohesion, have been seen by some to represent a form of Natural Law; a set of rules which could essentially have been established by any civilised society. This approach minimises the religious dimension of Noachide Law, regarding the code instead as a safeguard against humanity repeating its descent to the sort of moral degeneration embodied by the generation of the Flood.

In chapter 8 of his Hilchot Melachim, Rambam appears to take a very different approach:

“Anyone who accepts upon himself the fulfilment of these seven mitzvot and is precise in their observance is considered one of 'the pious among the gentiles' and will merit a share in the World to Come.

This applies only when he accepts them and fulfils them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses, our teacher, that Noah's descendants had been commanded to fulfil them previously. However, if he fulfils them out of intellectual conviction, he is not a resident alien, nor of 'the pious among the gentiles,' nor of their wise men.”

For Rambam, it would seem, it is not sufficient for non-Jews simply to observe the seven laws. They must be motivated by (and therefore implicitly believe in) the existence of God and His revelation to Moshe. Setting aside Maimonidean complications regarding the role of such beliefs in meriting the World to Come, various commentators discuss what source Rambam may have relied on for this ruling.

Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen objected that Rambam’s requirement effectively constituted an additional eighth Noachide commandment. Others view belief in God and revelation as a sort of ‘’meta-commandment’’ which transcends and provides the basis for all others. The Margoliot Hayam commentary to Tractate Sanhedrin argues that this required belief is implicitly contained within the Noachide prohibition against blasphemy.

On the basis of an idea discussed in Judaism Reclaimed, I would like to suggest that the very term “mitzvah” (commandment) used to describe these seven laws necessarily requires that the law has been legislated – and is therefore observed – as the result of a higher authority. If this is true, one who observes a law out of personal “intellectual conviction” alone cannot be said to be fulfilling a commandment.

This reading of Rambam is consistent with what he writes elsewhere concerning the concept of attributing reasons to mitzvot. While Rambam considers it praiseworthy to dwell upon the commandments and offer various rationales and possible benefits that they provide, it is fundamental for him that our relationship with the mitzvot is not limited to our subjective rationalisations. We may speculate upon and suggest reasons for the Torah’s laws regarding, for example, Niddah or prohibited foods. However, these speculations must be performed with recognition that the mitzvot are commandments from God, and not dependent therefore on our rationalisations for their legitimacy.

As Rambam expresses it in the conclusion of Hilchot Me’ilah:

“It is appropriate for a person to meditate on the judgments of the holy Torah and know their ultimate purpose according to his capacity. If he cannot find a reason or a motivating rationale for a practice, he should not regard it lightly…A person's natural inclination confronts him concerning…e.g., the prohibition of the meat of a pig, milk and meat, the calf whose neck is broken, the red heifer, and the goat sent to Azazel.”

And in Moreh Nevuchim 3:49 regarding laws for which we believe we know the reasons:

“…[J]ust as the things made by Him are totally perfect, so are His commandments totally just. However, our intellects are incapable of apprehending the perfection of everything that He has made and the justice of some of His commandments…What is hidden in both these areas is much more considerable than what is manifest.”

This need not be taken to the extremes proposed by Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who believed that reasons for religious commandments were beyond man's understanding, as well as irrelevant, and any attempt to attribute emotional significance to the performance of mitzvot was misguided and akin to idolatry.

Apparent reasons and benefits arising from mitzvot can certainly enrich their performance. We must never lose sight however of the meaning of the term “mitzvah”. Ultimately the law is a commandment from God and not contingent upon our understanding. Therefore, as Rambam teaches of the Noachide Laws, if one accepts and fulfils them merely out of “intellectual conviction” rather than as a revealed commandment of God, he or she has failed to observe a single Commandment.

First posted to Facebook 18 October 2020, here.

The stop-start status of pre-Sinaitic statutes

As we traverse the book of Bereishit, the subject of our ancestors’ observance of Torah law frequently surfaces. For many of us, our Judaism is so dominated by the regimen of halacha that we find it hard to relate to earlier role models who might have legitimately worshipped God in a very different manner. This leads us to embrace literal renderings of midrashim which, for example, depict Avraham and Lot as anachronistically observing the commandment of eating matzot on Pesach – centuries before the Exodus would occur.

The pre-eminent position popularly awarded to Rashi among Torah commentators has led to this being widely regarded as the only – or at least the mainstream – legitimate approach. Patriarchal episodes, such as Ya’akov marrying sisters, which contradict this narrative are typically treated as exceptions for reasons of necessity. It is certainly important, however, to be aware of how other traditional commentators dealt with this matter.

A central verse in this discussion is God’s praise for Avraham having “kept my safeguards, my commandments, my decrees and my instructions” (Bereishit 26:5). Rashi’s commentary to this verse cites a midrashic teaching that Avraham observed not only biblical laws which would later be revealed, but also rabbinic laws instituted to protect the integrity of biblical law.

Radak, by contrast, limits the scope of these teachings – presumably reading them in the context of the reality that none of these laws had yet been revealed and in some cases did not yet bear the symbolic significance that they would later attain. The “commandments and instructions” that Avraham observed, he therefore concludes, can only be referring to the sorts of “sichli” commandments which can be logically deduced. Noting the midrashic teachings that Avraham even observed safeguards such as erev tavshilin, Radak explains that this conveys that Avraham was so meticulous and precise in his observance of the rules which he kept, that he made his own additional regulations which went beyond what was strictly necessary.

Some commandments, however, clearly did pre-date the Sinai revelation. A prohibition against murder is related early in the book of Bereishit, and rabbinic tradition expands this to encompass a whole set of Noachide laws. Specific instructions were also given to the household of Avraham regarding circumcision and, as we read yesterday, to the descendants of Ya’akov concerning consumption of the gid hanashe (sciatic nerve).

It is with regard to gid hanashe that Rambam sets out what he calls a fundamental principle of how to understand these pre-Sinaitic laws. All of the mitzvot, explains Rambam in his Commentary to the Mishna, that we keep today, we do so because they were commanded to Moshe in the desert. Even if these were previously commanded to our ancestors such as circumcision and gid hanashe, this is not the reason that we are bound today. As is noted in that Mishnah (Chullin 7:6) – and further expanded upon in Judaism Reclaimed– the way in which such laws were observed in the pre-Sinai era sometimes varied from how the Torah would ultimately fix them.

While our ancestors seem to have observed at least some of what was to become Torah law, they did so with a degree of flexibility, with the discretion to determine how the law should best be applied to their particular circumstances. Once these commandments were to become a form of National Law at Sinai, however, they needed to be fixed into the framework of a legal system (see Moreh Nevuchim 3:34).

While it appears therefore that the Jews are bound by the Sinai revelation rather than prior prophetic pronouncements, the requirement of non-Jews to observe Noachide laws presumably remains as it was. Rambam, in Hilchot Melachim, writes that Adam HaRishon was commanded in these basic laws of human civilisation – an understanding which makes these laws sufficiently universal for corrupt and evil societies such as Sodom to receive punishment (he also notes that Moshe was subsequently commanded to enforce these laws).

Perhaps the most interesting commandment in this regard is that of circumcision. Rambam writes (Hil. Melachim 10:7) that the descendants of Yishmael and Eisav were not obligated in this since only Yitzchak, who remained loyal to Avraham’s religious and ethical teachings, was commanded with circumcision. This is difficult to reconcile, however, with his next statement:

“Our Sages related that the descendants of Keturah who are the offspring of Avraham that came after Yitzchak and Yishmael are also obligated in circumcision. Since, at present, the descendants of Yishmael have become intermingled with the descendants of Keturah, they are all obligated to be circumcised on the eighth day.”

Does this mean that the children of Keturah did remain loyal to Avraham’s teachings? We do not hear much about the fate of these descendants. And, interestingly, these laws appear to remain operative – at least in theory – based on their pre-Sinaitic instruction.

First posted to Facebook 11 December 2022, here.