The Torah’s opening parshiyot contain several divine instructions, within which the Gemara finds references to the Seven Noachide commandments. In some of my recent reading – possibly in preparation for a follow-up volume to Judaism Reclaimed – I came across an interesting discussion as to the nature and function of these Noachide Laws.
On the one hand these laws, which govern basic human interactions and societal cohesion, have been seen by some to represent a form of Natural Law; a set of rules which could essentially have been established by any civilised society. This approach minimises the religious dimension of Noachide Law, regarding the code instead as a safeguard against humanity repeating its descent to the sort of moral degeneration embodied by the generation of the Flood.
In chapter 8 of his Hilchot Melachim, Rambam appears to take a very different approach:
“Anyone who accepts upon himself the fulfilment of these seven mitzvot and is precise in their observance is considered one of 'the pious among the gentiles' and will merit a share in the World to Come.
This applies only when he accepts them and fulfils them because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them in the Torah and informed us through Moses, our teacher, that Noah's descendants had been commanded to fulfil them previously. However, if he fulfils them out of intellectual conviction, he is not a resident alien, nor of 'the pious among the gentiles,' nor of their wise men.”
For Rambam, it would seem, it is not sufficient for non-Jews simply to observe the seven laws. They must be motivated by (and therefore implicitly believe in) the existence of God and His revelation to Moshe. Setting aside Maimonidean complications regarding the role of such beliefs in meriting the World to Come, various commentators discuss what source Rambam may have relied on for this ruling.
Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen objected that Rambam’s requirement effectively constituted an additional eighth Noachide commandment. Others view belief in God and revelation as a sort of ‘’meta-commandment’’ which transcends and provides the basis for all others. The Margoliot Hayam commentary to Tractate Sanhedrin argues that this required belief is implicitly contained within the Noachide prohibition against blasphemy.
On the basis of an idea discussed in Judaism Reclaimed, I would like to suggest that the very term “mitzvah” (commandment) used to describe these seven laws necessarily requires that the law has been legislated – and is therefore observed – as the result of a higher authority. If this is true, one who observes a law out of personal “intellectual conviction” alone cannot be said to be fulfilling a commandment.
This reading of Rambam is consistent with what he writes elsewhere concerning the concept of attributing reasons to mitzvot. While Rambam considers it praiseworthy to dwell upon the commandments and offer various rationales and possible benefits that they provide, it is fundamental for him that our relationship with the mitzvot is not limited to our subjective rationalisations. We may speculate upon and suggest reasons for the Torah’s laws regarding, for example, Niddah or prohibited foods. However, these speculations must be performed with recognition that the mitzvot are commandments from God, and not dependent therefore on our rationalisations for their legitimacy.
As Rambam expresses it in the conclusion of Hilchot Me’ilah:
“It is appropriate for a person to meditate on the judgments of the holy Torah and know their ultimate purpose according to his capacity. If he cannot find a reason or a motivating rationale for a practice, he should not regard it lightly…A person's natural inclination confronts him concerning…e.g., the prohibition of the meat of a pig, milk and meat, the calf whose neck is broken, the red heifer, and the goat sent to Azazel.”
And in Moreh Nevuchim 3:49 regarding laws for which we believe we know the reasons:
“…[J]ust as the things made by Him are totally perfect, so are His commandments totally just. However, our intellects are incapable of apprehending the perfection of everything that He has made and the justice of some of His commandments…What is hidden in both these areas is much more considerable than what is manifest.”
This need not be taken to the extremes proposed by Yeshayahu Leibowitz, who believed that reasons for religious commandments were beyond man's understanding, as well as irrelevant, and any attempt to attribute emotional significance to the performance of mitzvot was misguided and akin to idolatry.
Apparent reasons and benefits arising from mitzvot can certainly enrich their performance. We must never lose sight however of the meaning of the term “mitzvah”. Ultimately the law is a commandment from God and not contingent upon our understanding. Therefore, as Rambam teaches of the Noachide Laws, if one accepts and fulfils them merely out of “intellectual conviction” rather than as a revealed commandment of God, he or she has failed to observe a single Commandment.
First posted to Facebook 18 October 2020, here.
