A rabbinic response to sacrificial price gouging

Attempts to identify external motive behind rabbinic interpretations or applications of hermeneutical derashot typically produce claims and theories which rely on a great deal of speculation. Taken at face value, legislative disputes among the sages seem to be based almost exclusively upon their contrasting assessments as to which application of Talmudic logic and rules of scriptural interpretation is deemed the most persuasive. As Talmud Reclaimed explores, however, the Sanhedrin was also required to consider the needs of the generation when processing and voting on these details of biblical law. 

Consider these words of the Yad Malachi (a similar principle emerges from the Meshech Chochma): 

“Regarding middot and other interpretative tools through which the Torah is expounded: new laws were formulated throughout the generations according to the needs of the times, and they directed them in the form of full derashot in accordance with transmitted principles.” 

The difficulty which remains for us is to determine how and to what extent practical considerations and needs of the generation were balanced with the purely logical and interpretive principles and arguments which appear to dominate the Midrashei Halacha? 

One of the most insightful and illustrative examples in rabbinic literature relates to a law which we read about at the start of yesterday’s parashah. The parshiyot of Tazria and Metzorah describe the korbanot that a woman is required to bring after giving birth, miscarrying or being subject to certain forms of bodily discharge. It would seem that many families who lived far from Jerusalem would only visit the Mikdash on relatively rare occasions – presumably around a pilgrimage festival. The pressing question therefore emerged: For a woman who has experienced multiple births, miscarriages or discharges, is she obliged to bring an additional korban for each distinct obligation or does it suffice for her to offer a single combined korban for all of them? 

As understood by the Gemara (Keritot 8a), each of these positions is advanced by one set of Tannaim, supported by their respective applications of standard Talmudic hermeneutical principles in order to derive this new law from existing precedents. The law initially appears to have been established by the Sanhedrin in accordance with the stricter interpretation, which required a far greater number of korbanot to be brought by these women. What then transpired is related by a Mishnah there: 

It happened in Jerusalem that the price of a pair of doves rose to a golden denar. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: By this sanctuary, I shall not go to sleep tonight before they cost but a [silver] denar! Then he entered the court and taught: if a woman had five certain births or five discharges she needs to bring only one offering, and she may then eat sacrifices, and she is not liable to bring the other [offerings]. Thereupon the price of a pair of birds stood at a quarter of a [silver] denar each. 

As understood by a number of Rishonim to this passage, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel reacted to the extortionate pricing of doves by re-entering the Sanhedrin and persuading his colleagues to rule instead according to the more lenient derashah. If this is all correct it provides us with a key insight into how the Sanhedrin combined Talmudic wisdom and practical expediency in reaching their conclusions. Yes – it is true – that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and his Sanhedrin were prepared to reverse their initial ruling in order to make the sacrificial obligation affordable for women. But crucially, both the initial stricter interpretation as well as the subsequent more lenient retraction were in line with pre-existing Tannaic derashot, therefore both fitting within the parameters of legitimate legislative possibility.

First posted on Facebook 16 April 2024, here.