Can God change His mind?

In a popular post last month, this group explored a suggestion (advanced by the Seforno and developed by Rabbi S. R. Hirsch) that God’s initially “universal” plan for the world was recalibrated and amended to seek out a single “Chosen Nation” which would receive and transmit His Torah. While that post addressed the issue from the perspective of Choseness, the very idea of God appearing to change His mind and resort to Plan B raises thorny theological problems.

Judaism Reclaimed highlights Rav Hirsch’s approach to tackling this difficulty. Focusing on a close grammatical reading of the relevant biblical phrase, he argues that none of these amendments represented a 'change of God's mind', but rather a tailoring of the divine plan in response to human conduct.

“And God regretted (vayinachem) that He had made man upon the earth, and He became grieved in His heart.” (Bereshit 6:6)

Crucially the Torah employs the active form of the verb "vayinachem" rather than the reflexive form of the verb "vayitnachem", which would have implied that God changed himself. This usage supports the idea that the element of change was caused by a factor — the exercise of human free will — that was inherently external to God rather than being intrinsic to His original plan.

The word vayinachem appears again in response to Israel’s repentance and Moshe’s prayer in the immediate aftermath of the Golden Calf:

“God reconsidered (vayinachem) the evil He had said He would do to His people.” (Shemot 32:14)

This can be seen in contrast to the word vayitnachem – which the Torah itself tells us cannot be applied to God:

“God is not a man that He should lie, nor is He a mortal that He should change His mind (veyitnecham).” (Bemidbar 23:19)

Interestingly, while Rav Hirsch in this instance steadfastly rejects the literal implication of the Torah’s text, he nevertheless makes it clear that he opposes the position advocated for by Rambam which seeks to reinterpret and explain any biblical terms which appear to impute physicality to God.

“Scholars have philosophised about these expressions [anthropomorphism], in order to keep us far from ascribing to God material features. This gives rise, however, to the danger that the Personality of God will become increasingly blurred and indistinct to our perception. Had that been the Torah’s intention it could easily have avoided such expressions … Belief in the Personality of God is more important than the speculations of those who reject the attribution of material features to God.”

Elsewhere Rav Hirsch explained further how: “the maturest mind of the philosopher knows no more about the essence of God than the simple mind of the child”.

As Judaism Reclaimed proceeds to analyse in a subsequent chapter, Rav Hirsch’s position comes very close to that of earlier rabbinic authorities who took biblical descriptions of God at face value. Marc Shapiro, in The Limits of Orthodox Theology, invests great effort to collect and present rabbinic statements which, taken superficially, reflect belief in a physical deity. While he sees medieval rabbinic commentator, Moshe Taku, as the “most significant" example of rabbinic corporealism, leading scholar of medival rabbinic mysticism, Joseph Dan begs to differ, writing that:

"He [R’ Taku] insists on the literal acceptance of the prophets' descriptions of their visions as well as the anthropomorphic references to God in talmudic-midrashic literature. He does not do so because of his belief in the literal veracity of these descriptions; he only insists that they represent the maximum that can be conveyed concerning God's essence and appearance, and that any further inquiry cannot lead to valid conclusions. God chose to reveal to us in the scriptures whatever is found in them: man should be satisfied with that, and ask no more questions. It is not that Rabbi Moses Taku believed in an anthropomorphic God; most probably, he did not.”

Having addressed claims of rabbinic belief in a physical deity, Judaism Reclaimed then proceeds to demonstrate, however, that none of this would be likely to impress Rambam, who states with equal force that any attempt to worship or connect “without knowledge” to God such as by attributing physical features to Him:

“does not in true reality mention or think about God. For that thing which is in his imagination and which he mentions is his mouth does not correspond to any being at all and has merely been invented by his imagination”. (Moreh Nevuchim 3:51)

Since, for Rambam, connection to God is an absolute reality and achieved primarily by means of the intellect, the quality and existence of such a connection is directly affected by the correctness of a person’s intellectual perception of God. He cannot accept, therefore, the notion that one should just accept the biblical text at face value. Instead biblical indications about the incorporeality of God combined with a powerful rabbinic tradition serve as signposts to scholars seeking to maximise their understanding of and relationship with God.

Find out more at www.TalmudReclaimed.com.

First posted on Facebook 10 November 2024. For comments and discussion, click here.

The demons in the daf

Daf Yomi enthusiasts last week found themselves submerged in sugyot of demons and dark forces that occupy a prominent position in the final chapter of Pesachim. While many are aware that Rambam – like other sages from the Geonic-Spanish tradition – did not recognise the existence of such dark forces, it is not always apparent how they are left to explain demonic appearances in the Talmud. Below is a short excerpt from the chapter of Judaism Reclaimed which tackles magic, necromancy, demons and divination within Judaism:

The greatest challenge facing Rambam's explanation of the dark arts is posed by numerous Talmudic sources, whose descriptions of magic and demons (which are strongly linked to necromancy and other such practices) create a clear impression that such power was regarded as genuine. While Rambam has no systematic commentary on the Gemara, his general approach to these sources can be inferred from an early chapter in his Moreh Nevuchim dealing with the offspring of Adam HaRishon.

The Torah describes Adam’s son Shet as being "betzalmo kidmuto" (in his form or image) of Adam — a term which Rambam links to the earlier description of Adam as having been created "betzelem Elokim" (literally “in the likeness of God”). Rambam then cites a Gemara which states that, from the moment of his sin until the birth of Shet, Adam bore offspring which were not "betzalmo" but rather were "ruchot" or demons. "Tzelem Elokim" — the only aspect of mankind that can be said to be Godly — is his intellect, through which a person can subdue his instincts and negative traits and comprehend divine truths. A person who fails to develop himself in this way is a "beheima betzurat adam" (an animal in human form) rather than "betzelem Elokim".

However, God has also endowed humanity with the free will to use this intellectual potential for evil, to subdue and oppress others. As history repeatedly demonstrates, the greatest misery and hardship experienced by mankind is caused by those who have used their intellect to devise ways of furthering human suffering. This is the sort of 'demon' that Rambam understands the various Gemaras to be describing as dwelling in uninhabited areas, damaging unguarded buildings, and attacking those who travel unaccompanied at night. In a similar vein, those who use their intellect to trick and mislead the masses with 'magic' into the cruel and immoral idolatrous cults can presumably also be accorded the epithet of 'demon'.

A broader and more radical suggestion is found in the commentary of R’ Menachem Meiri — a later Rishon who followed Rambam's approach to Jewish philosophy. Commenting on the final chapter of Pesachim, which dedicates several pages to warnings of demons, Meiri identifies as key the Gemara's statement that "those who do not take note of demons are not bothered by them". Meiri then explains that belief in Babylonian demonology was so embedded in the perceptions of the masses that it would have been futile and even counter-productive for the sages to deny publicly their existence. Instead they attempted to wean people off such beliefs, gently encouraging them that such concern for demons was unnecessary.

While Rambam does not explicitly endorse such an approach, he does decry the corrupting influence of mystical and supernatural beliefs which became attached to and somewhat integrated within Judaism as a result of its exile among pagan nations. In this regard it is instructive that the Gemara also teaches that those who still dwelt in Israel were totally unconcerned with and unaffected by any of the demons mentioned - demons whose names and attributes mirrored those of contemporary pagan Babylonian beliefs.

First posted to Facebook 15 March 2021, here.