One of the central themes in Talmud Reclaimed (available in the US in the coming days) is a thorough exploration of the status of Talmudic law in the modern era. What does it mean to say that “Ravina and Rav Ashi are sof-hora’ah” [the conclusion of authoritative legal rulings]?
An important case study in this analysis relates to a halachic question with which many Jews are grappling with this week: should Tefillin be worn in the intermediate Chol Hamoed days of a festival?
The Talmudic law on this matter is somewhat ambiguous: while tefillin should not be worn on Shabbat and Yom Tov, it is unclear whether this extends to the less restrictive intermediate days of the festivals. Medieval halachic authorities were divided on the matter; while it was unanimously agreed that tefillinshould be worn on these days, they disputed whether a blessing should be recited since this was a situation of doubt. Rabbi Yosef Karo, however, sought to resolve the matter by introducing a strongly worded kabbalistic prohibition against performing this commandment on Chol Hamoed, adding that:
"… since our Talmud is inconclusive on the matter, who can dare to actively oppose the words of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai who prohibits it so powerfully?"
As a result of Rabbi Karo’s reliance upon Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s mystical writings, the custom in Israel—and increasingly also in the rest of the world—is not to wear tefillin at all on these days, even without reciting a blessing.
Not all, however, were satisfied with Rabbi Karo’s conclusion. Rabbi Shlomo Luria, a leading authority in the same era, fought fiercely for the primacy of the Talmud in the process of determining Jewish law. Responding to Rabbi Karo’s embrace of Zoharic sources within the context of legal discussion he stated forcefully that
"even if Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai stood before us in order to change our practice we would not listen to him since in most matters the halachah does not accord with him."
Prominent authorities such as the Bach, Chatam Sofer and Nodah BiYehudah similarly sought to exclude the input of mystical sources in the halachic process in rulings relating to sending away the mother bird and chalitzah. Nevertheless, popular practice in subsequent generations gradually approved and broadened the Shulchan Aruch’s innovation and, despite the concerns of notable scholars, it has increasingly been regarded as a legitimate source of Jewish law.
Nevertheless, a degree of uncertainty remains as to the level of legal authority which Kabbalah is to be accorded and how, precisely, it should be integrated into the pre-existing corpus of Talmudic teachings and rulings. As Rabbi Karo appeared to recognise, and as the Mishnah Berurah has more recently affirmed, kabbalistic teachings cannot be considered binding where they deviate from Talmudic sources. How strictly this theory is to be applied, however, has been subject to significant disagreement. Rabbi Menachem Azaria (Rama) MiPano, for example, ruled that the Zohar is to be followed even if this requires a stretched reading of the relevant Talmudic source in order to avoid a contradiction. Some of the rulings of Rabbi Karo himself appeared to apply kabbalah in a way that was inconsistent with how the Talmud had previously been understood.
The Vilna Gaon, meanwhile, is recorded as having cryptically asserted that “in no place is the Zohar in conflict with the Talmud”, adding that it is legitimate to base a stringent ruling upon the Zohar even when the Talmud is lenient. The context of the Gaon’s statement concerns whether one must refrain only from passing in front of a person who is praying, as the Talmud requires, or even from passing by in any direction, as the Zohar encourages. While the Gaon is prepared to view this simply as an added stringency rather than as a contradiction, Rabbi Yechiel Michel Epstein (Aruch HaShulchan) expresses great difficulty in accepting this kabbalistic stringency since it prohibits a practice that the Talmud clearly and unanimously permits.
Notwithstanding Rabbi Epstein’s objection, it is evident that numerous kabbalistic stringencies and customs have become seamlessly integrated into the body of commonly-practiced Jewish law as a result of their inclusion by Rabbi Karo in the Shulchan Aruch. In many circles, laws originating from Kabbalah are now regarded as more authoritative than those of the Talmud, with Rabbi Yosef Chaim from Baghdad (Ben Ish Chai) granting unchallengeable authority to the legal positions of the Arizal on the basis that they were divinely inspired, having been communicated by Eliyahu HaNavi.
The Ben Ish Chai’s position that the Zohar’s supernatural origin rendered its content halachically unassailable is itself vulnerable to challenge. Even if it could be ascertained that the Zohar and writings of the Arizal did originate with Eliyahu, it is still far from clear that they could be relied upon as part of the halachic process. The Talmudic rabbis contemplated the authority that might be accorded to supernatural input of Eliyahu within their debates and rejected the notion that this could influence the outcome to change an accepted practice:
If Eliyahu should come and declare…“chalitzah can be performed with a sandal”, we would not listen to him. [Yevamot 102a]
As Rambam explains, the rabbis of the Talmud were applying a fundamental principle of Jewish law of “it is not in Heaven!” which establishes that any attempt by a prophet to rely upon supernatural sources to determine halachah is invalid. Moreover, any prophet who attempts to do so actually demonstrates that he is a charlatan. In a powerful rejection of the suggestion that mystical sources can claim superior halachic authority over the Talmud on the basis of their supernatural origin, Rav Ovadyah Yosef wrote:
We have concluded “it is not in Heaven!” so what basis is there to set aside the mainstream legal authorities and instead grasp the words of the Arizal as if they were given to Moshe at Sinai?
First posted on Facebook 2 October 2023, here.
