Showing posts with label Sages and Sanhedrin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sages and Sanhedrin. Show all posts

Tuesday 23 July 2024

Halachah in exile: rigidity, dispute and "the words of the living God"

Our previous post, Rambam and Decline of the Generations, introduced the Meshech Chochmah’s suggestion that our parashah warns of a loss of Torah wisdom in its tochachah-punishments. This suggestion was then developed and led to an exploration of the notion of ‘generational decline’ from a Maimonidean perspective. This post will look at another dimension of this loss of Torah knowledge which Judaism Reclaimed examines: the consequent rigidity of the halachic system and proliferation of dispute.

The Meshech Chochmah describes the dynamic role performed by the Sanhedrin of innovating (in accordance with the rules transmitted to them) in order to ensure that the Torah was suited to guide each generation according to its needs. Quoting Rambam’s introduction to Mishneh Torah, he laments that, as a result of exile, the nation suffered a diminution of Torah scholarship as well as the total loss of the Sanhedrin and ruach hakodesh. These losses necessitated the fixing and recording of the Oral Law. Since the time of the Mishnah, no beit din has had permission to innovate any matter. This inability to innovate or develop the Torah through hermeneutical interpretations or Rabbinic decrees, the Meshech Chochmah continues, has led to a questioning of the Torah’s continued relevance and application in a modern era, and is an inevitable result of the exile predicted in the tochachah.
Our chapter cites Talmudic examples of this previous halachic flexibility, such as frequent changes to rules of muktzeh and havdallah,which were based on the circumstances of the generation, and lenient rulings in matters of Torah law where the community was unable to afford required sacrifices. Rabbi David Nieto (Mateh Dan) writes that the persecution and exile also caused the oral tradition to fix numerous laws – such as order of prayers – which had previously been governed by individual autonomy or local custom. Significant variation in Talmudic accounts of tefillin and tzitzit– as well as unearthed ancient specimens – would appear to support this proposition.
A further phenomenon which Rambam attributes to the Roman persecution at the end of the Second Temple period is the proliferation of halachic disputes. This manifested itself in two ways. First, by limiting or at times totally preventing the effective functioning of the Sanhedrin (the supreme legal body charged with resolving halachic disputes as soon as they arose), the persecution led to differences of opinion between Sages both becoming more entrenched and to their being transmitted to students in their unresolved form. Secondly, the oppression and anti-religious decrees severely inhibited the teaching of Torah. As well as causing direct loss of Torah knowledge and expertise, generations of students with limited exposure to their Rabbinic teachers increasingly argued as to the details of transmitted halachic teachings.
Our attention then turns to the difficult question of how we are to relate, in today’s generation, to a Torah and religion which contains so many apparently contradictory and irreconcilable concepts, approaches, and opinions. In halachah and aggadah we are guided by the axiom of “eilu va’eilu divrei Elokim chayim”—all parties to a dispute represent equally the word of God. But at first sight, this merely deepens the problem: How can clearly conflicting viewpoints all be said to emanate from a single Divine source?
This question of how we are to understand the notion of how God can be taken to have endorsed both parties to a dispute is posed by a Gemara in the context of a debate over the cause of strife between a Benjaminite man and his concubine in the Book of Judges. The Gemara describes Eliyahu HaNavi reporting to one of the disputants, R’ Evyatar, that God was “busy studying the portion of pilegesh b’Give’ah,” and had approved both opinions, since eilu va’eilu divrei Elokim chayim. Probed further by R’ Evyatar as to how God could be in doubt with regard to the true nature of a historical event, Eliyahu explained that both factors cited in the debate were indeed contributing factors to the strife, and together could produce an accurate account of the episode.
A similar explanation is offered by Rashi elsewhere to explain how eilu va’eilu can be applied to a halachic debate. Rashi writes that both parties to the dispute are using their logic to determine how the case in question can be related most precisely to existing halachic principles and precedent. Both positions can therefore be assumed to represent equally valid applications of halachic methodology. Therefore, with sufficient scholarship, we could potentially subdivide the question into multiple scenarios, allowing each party’s argument to be adopted where more appropriate.
Further lengthy discussions include speculation as to how this technique might be applied to the rationalist and mystical traditions within Judaism (both of which accuse the other of having been infiltrated by external influences as a result of exile) as well as a detailed analysis of other aspects of Tannaic dispute such as the role of ethics in determining halachahand the origin of the oral tradition’s hermeneutical principles for interpreting the Torah. We also examine the potential obstacles that stand in the way of reintroducing flexibility into the current halachic system.
First posted to Facebook 14 May 2020, here.

Wednesday 10 July 2024

Calendar complications and second day celebrations

As I sit writing this post in Jerusalem, I imagine that a significant proportion of its eventual readers has recently emerged from “Two-day Yom Tov” – a second day of festive Sukkot celebrations and restrictions. The institution of second day Yom Tov for those living outside of Israel, which was decreed by one of the last sitting Sanhedrins, is at the heart of debates between traditionalists and modernisers of the Jewish world.

On the one hand, as a law upheld by the conclusion of the Talmud, it is regarded by traditional authorities such as Rambam as an unimpeachable decree (at least until a new Sanhedrin can be formed to rule on the matter). Its opponents however counter that the initial calendrical confusion which gave birth to the extra festive day of doubt has long ceased to be relevant. The extra day as it exists in our era represents a burden and strain on those who celebrate it, particularly when – as with Sukkot this year – it falls repeatedly on working days.
This post will not address the question of authority of Jewish courts to amend or repeal an earlier ruling – a matter I posted on recently here. Instead I will focus on a fascinating and original approach of Rabbi S. R. Hirsch to the question of second day Yom Tov and the dynamics of the Jewish calendar in general.
Initially the Court’s declaration of a New Moon contained a degree of flexibility, with months established on the basis of witness testimony of the new moon’s appearance. It was only as a result of persecution and exile that the process of witness verification was suspended by the Sanhedrin in favour of a fixed calendar.
At first glance the introduction of a formal perpetual calendar that requires neither verification nor external adjustment appears to represent modernisation and progress. Its sophisticated methods of calculation made redundant the Sanhedrin's reliance on the laborious and potentially erratic process of interrogating witnesses.
In an extensive discussion on the subject, however, R' Hirsch rejects this assertion as a fundamental misunderstanding of the function of the Jewish calendar and the religious symbolism of Rosh Chodesh, the Jewish new moon. Rosh Chodesh is sometimes portrayed as paying homage to the moon and forces of nature — a remnant of pagan practice which was recycled into Judaism and subsequently re-clothed in monotheistic terms. According to such an understanding, precise calendar calculations which can more accurately follow the lunar cycle should certainly be viewed as a positive development.
In his rejection of such as approach, R' Hirsch points to a series of Talmudic rulings (Rosh Hashanah 20-25) which challenge the notion that Rosh Chodesh is an attempt to pay tribute to the natural lunar cycle. This series of rulings teaches, for example, that even if the entire nation had witnessed the new moon on the 30th day but the Sanhedrin was unable to declare the new moon formally before nightfall, the new month would begin only on the 31st day. Perhaps most significantly, Rosh Chodesh can deliberately be declared on the 31st day even if it had been witnessed on the 30th, if such an 'incorrect' declaration would be beneficial to the nation (for example to prevent Yom Kippur and Shabbat from falling on consecutive days). What this suggests is that the process of declaring the New Moon consciously removes the Jewish calendar from the natural cycles of heavenly spheres, placing it instead under the control of human decision making. A similar analysis emerges from the Sanhedrin’s control over how to calculate the Jewish leap year, with the Court declaring and controlling the Jewish calendar often on the basis of national interests rather than strict celestial cycles.
On the basis of this explanation we can understand the significance of this commandment of sanctifying the new moon being commanded to the Jews, as a preface to their monotheistic emergence from pagan Egypt. This first commandment that the Jews received as a nation established as a matter of fundamental importance the freedom and power of God (and by extension the free will that He grants to humanity) over the heavenly spheres and natural forces worshipped by the determinist pagans. For Egyptians and other such pagans there is no concept of renewal or freedom from the almighty forces of nature.
Returning to the theme of second day Yom Tov, R' Hirsch notes that it was the same leader (Hillel the Younger) who calculated and recorded the future calendar system for the post-Sanhedrin exile who also legislated the creation of the 'two-day Yom Tov'. Beitza (4a) describes how the ruling concerning this additional festive day was maintained for Jews living outside of the land of Israel even once the adopted lunar calendar had apparently negated the need for it. R' Hirsch suggests that a reason for retaining these apparently superfluous days of festivity was to prevent the newly-regulated and precise lunar calendar from being seen as an improvement — and a more accurate way of following the natural lunar cycle. 'Second Day Yom Tov' can, to an extent, challenge this misunderstanding by demonstrating that declarations of holy days and times do not merely reflect the cycles of nature but are controlled by human thought and decision-making. In our times this idea has developed further with a dynamic halachic debate over who qualifies as a resident of Israel or the Exile for the purposes of this law.
First posted to Facebook 23 September 2021, here.

Reasons for mitzvot: the hidden and revealed

In one particularly mysterious verse from yesterday’s Torah reading we are told “The hidden matters are for Hashem our God, and the revealed...