Can AI ever replace a posek?

We are honoured this week to be hosting a fascinating piece by R. Gil Student (adapted from his recent book, Articles of Faith: Traditional Jewish Belief in the Internet Era)

Dicta. org.il recently released an AI “rabbi” that answers halachic questions in the style of a classical responsum. The AI is trained on rabbinic literature, including primary texts, commentaries, codes and responsa. It sees how poskim (halachic decisors) reason, interpret texts, compare cases, consider the unique circumstances of the question, and arrive at answers. While to my mind it does not yet perform at the level of a competent rabbi, it offers us a realistic idea of the possibility of a coherent technology that can answer halachic questions independently. Once it is perfected, may any individual Jew looking to fulfill God’s word ask an AI a halachic question and follow its answer? And once AI is available to do this, would we be obligated to ask an AI rather than a human, with all his frailties?

I. AI and Divine Assistance

One approach to take is to argue that a posek, a halachic authority, requires divine assistance, siyata di-shmaya. God will help a rabbi reach the appropriate conclusion but will not assist an AI. Therefore, an AI lacks the necessary siyata di-shmaya that a rabbi has. But is this true? If the siyata di-shmaya is for the rabbi’s sake, then an AI has no merit to deserve it. But if the siyata di-shmaya is for the questioner, who wants to fulfill the divine will, why would God not help the questioner via the AI? If the rabbi is a divine vessel, why can’t the AI be a divine vessel also?

Another approach is to compare AI to a gentile. Of course, a gentile is different. He is a child of God, created in the divine image. However, the comparison still has value as a kal va-chomer, an a fortiori logical argument. If a gentile, who is conscious and able to think and reason, is unable to issue a halachic ruling, then surely an AI is unable to do so. Yet, where do we see that a gentile may not serve as a posek? I am not aware of any text or precedent that says so, although I welcome any suggested texts. Absent a text, we need a strong explanation of if and why a learned gentile, who for whatever reason and in whichever way became a master of halachic texts, may not serve as a posek.

A few years ago, when people were debating whether women can be rabbis, one line of argument was that there is no longer any halachic requirements for a rabbi. As long as a woman knows halachah, she can serve as a rabbi. As a response to that argument, I asked whether a gentile who studies Shulchan Aruch can also serve as a rabbi. If he knows the material and can teach it to people, why can’t a gentile serve as a rabbi? Of course, a Jewish woman is part of the Jewish people and the Sinai covenant. She observes the commandments and the Jewish holidays, and is part of the age-long Jewish story. But does any of that matter in terms of issuing a halachic ruling?

II. Two Types of Pesak?

In order to begin answering these questions, we first need to distinguish between two types of paskening, issuing halachic rulings. The Gemara (Eruvin 62b) says that a student may not issue a halachic ruling in the presence of his mentor to the point that it is a capital offense (ibid., 63a). Rav Meir (Maharam) of Rothenburg (13th cen., Germany) is quoted as distinguishing between an original ruling and an existing ruling found in books (Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Talmud Torah 5:3). A student may offer in his teacher’s presence a halachic ruling that he found in a published book because he is not really ruling. He is just serving as a technical reference, offering the knowledge that he has acquired through his study. However, a new halachic ruling requires evaluation and consideration. A halachic reference is the regurgitation of information. A halachic ruling is the creation of new information. Significantly, this distinction is recorded in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 242:9) and explained by Shach (ad loc., 16). While many dispute Shach’s explanation, Rav Shmuel Wosner (21st cen., Israel) argues that this idea applies to post-Talmudic codes and responsa that are intended for practical teachings (Shevet Ha-Levi 2:113).

With this distinction between a halachic reference and a halachic ruling, we can understand another law. The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 7a) says that when one rabbi rules on a specific case strictly, another rabbi is not allowed to permit it. One approach to this seemingly technical rule is that pesak, halachic rulings, do not just teach the law. A rabbi’s ruling creates a religious status in the object under question. Is this chicken kosher or non-kosher? When you ask your rabbi, he defines the chicken’s status for you. Even if another rabbi disagrees and says that the chicken is kosher, it doesn’t matter. If he can show that the rabbi was mistaken on an explicit law (to’eh bi-dvar mishnah) then he nullifies the original ruling. Absent that, the first rabbi has changed the chicken’s religious status for you. He has not just taught you the law but determined what the law is for you. A pesak is a religious act, not just a technical reference.

III. Pesak as a Mitzvah

The Torah says regarding the priests: “that you are to teach the Children of Israel all the statutes” (Lev. 10:11). Rav Yitzchak of Corbeil (13th cen., France) counts this as a mitzvah on anyone capable of issuing a halachic ruling (if no one else more capable is available; Semak, no. 101). Issuing a pesak is a mitzvah, a religious obligation. While others include this as part of the mitzvah to study and teach Torah, Rav Yitzchak sees it as an independent mitzvah. Either way, issuing a halachic ruling is an act of religious devotion. It is a fulfillment of a divine command that allows the respondent to enter the religious life of the questioner and create for him a new halachic reality.

Is it any wonder, then, that a gentile may not serve as a posek, a halachic decisor? It is one thing to serve as a halachic reference, to direct people to existing rulings. Anyone who has studied halachah can tell people what, for example, Mishnah Berurah says about a specific case. A computer can do this, as well. A person is better than a regular computer at understanding the nuances of a question and offering the appropriate reference source. An AI might be even better at this than a person, with perfect recall of a massive library. However, this is just about referencing past rulings.

Issuing a new halachic ruling is not just about providing a reference — it is a religious activity. I suggest that only those within the religious community, only those who are part of the covenant and fulfill commandments, can create a halachic reality by issuing a ruling. Jewish men, women, and children fulfill commandments and take part in the halachic process as consumers. Therefore, if qualified and in the right circumstances, they may also take part in the other end of the halachic process as producers. A Jewish man, woman or child can serve as a posek. Someone outside the halachic covenant cannot create a halachic reality and therefore cannot serve as a posek. This would prevent someone from asking a gentile and, kal va-chomer, an AI for halachic rulings.

There is still room for AI in the halachic process. An AI can serve the broader public as a halachic reference for questions that have already been answered, directing people to the relevant texts and even providing them source sheets. An AI can also serve as a rabbi’s assistant, gathering relevant sources and proposing different approaches to answering a question. Ultimately, the posek will evaluate all the relevant texts and precedents, think through all the mitigating circumstances and personal considerations, weigh the halachic and meta-halachic issues involved, and deliver a halachic ruling.

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Articles of faith: approaches to biblical criticism

For many years, Rabbi Gil Student's Hirhurim blog and social media activity has been at the forefront of online Orthodox discussion and debate as to how to grapple with challenging topics in the modern world. A number of the chapters of Judaism Reclaimed benefited from his thorough and well-sourced posts. Now Rabbi Student has published an account and summary of much of this discussion. Below is a sample - on the subject of Biblical Criticism. We are honoured to host him on this page.

Forgiveness and Biblical Criticism

By Rabbi Gil Student

Biblical critics often point to repetitions in the biblical text as evidence of multiple texts that were (clumsily) edited together by a redactor. One example is the story of Yosef’s forgiveness of his brothers, which seems to be repeated unnecessarily. In my recently published book, Articles of Faith: Traditional Jewish Belief in the Internet Era, I explore traditional beliefs about the authorship of the Bible and three failed approaches and one successful approach to reconciling those with biblical criticism. In another chapter, I explore the topic of forgiveness and show that biblical critics oversimplify the topic when claiming that there is a repetition in the story of Yosef and his brothers.

I. The Forgiveness Doublet

R. Jonathan Sacks argues that Yosef’s forgiveness of his brothers is the first time in history we explicitly find someone forgiving others. After testing his brothers and finding that they had truly changed, Yosef can no longer hold himself back and reveals his identity to them. He tells them, “And now, do not be distressed and do not be angry with yourselves for selling me here, for God sent me ahead of you to preserve life” (Gen. 45:5; see R. Jonathan Sacks, Covenant & Conversation, Genesis, p. 323ff.; idem., Essays on Ethics, p. 65ff.; idem., Ceremony & Celebration: Introduction to the Holidays, p. 33ff.)

In a later analysis, R. Sacks deepens his study by explaining the double-passage of Yosef’s forgiveness of his brothers. In Gen. 45, Yosef pardons his brothers for their actions, as noted above. In Gen. 50, after Ya’akov dies, the brothers fear Yosef’s retribution. To save themselves, they send a message to Yosef in Ya’akov’s name, asking for forgiveness. “Your father left these instructions before he died: ‘This is what you are to say to Yosef: Please forgive your brothers’ wrong and the sin they committed in treating you so badly.’ Now please forgive the sins of the servants of the God of your father” (Gen. 50:15-17). Yosef replies, again absolving them of guilt for the entire episode. Why is this repeated in the text?

Ephraim Speiser claims that these two passages emerge from different authors (Anchor Bible Genesis, p. 378). However, this approach fails to see the depth in the narrative, the important message about human nature and reconciliation. In the posthumously published Judaism’s Life-Changing Ideas (p. 59), R. Sacks differentiates between these two passages by saying that the first passage looks like forgiveness but is not — in fact, the term is not even mentioned. Only the second passage reflects forgiveness. We can expand on that distinction by defining our terms and concepts more precisely, thereby understanding an important lesson the text is teaching us about forgiveness.

II. Forgoing and Forgiving

One way to think about forgiveness is by noting how its language is used in finance. When you forgive a loan, you allow someone not to repay you. You lent him money, which he owes you. He has an obligation to you. You forgive the loan, removing that obligation. In this framework, forgiveness is the removal of an obligation. If someone hurts you, whether intentionally or negligently, he has an obligation to repay that offense, to make you whole. Even if the offense entails no tangible loss, he needs to restore your sense of completeness, your emotional state. When you forgive him, you remove that obligation. While we use the language of forgiveness in this case, really it is an example for forgoing. You, the victim, declare that you are willing to pardon him, to forgo the debt due you.

Forgiveness goes further than forgoing. It takes two to forgive. The offender must repent and attempt to undo the harm, if at all possible. To obtain forgiveness, a sinner must undergo personal change. Maimonides lists four steps of repentance: regret, cessation of the sin, confession and commitment to refrain from this sin in the future (Hilchos Teshuvah 2:2). However, these steps suffice only for sins between God and man. The Mishnah (Yoma 85b) says that interpersonal sins also need the forgiveness of the victim. In contrast to forgoing, forgiving means reconciling, healing the damaged relationship between offender and victim through an apology and an acceptance.

III. Yosef’s Two Acts of Forgiveness

At first, on revealing his identity to his brothers, Yosef tells his brothers, “And now, do not be distressed and do not be angry with yourselves for selling me here, for God sent me ahead of you to preserve life” (Gen. 45:5). Later, after Ya’akov dies, the brothers say to Yosef in Ya’akov’s name, “Now please forgive the sins of the servants of the God of your father” (Gen. 50:17). To this, Yosef responds favorably.

We see in this double passage the important differences between forgoing and forgiving. At first, Yosef forwent the brothers’ terrible treatment of him. He told them not to worry about it because he did not hold it against them. But they never had a chance to apologize before the events moved forward very quickly. There was never a real reconciliation. The brothers never fully talked through with Yosef what had transpired and their roles in it, and therefore there were still unanswered questions within the relationship. Yosef removed the moral obligation from the brothers but he never repaired their relationship. That is an example of forgoing, a lower level for forgiveness.

Only later, through the artificial medium of their deceased father Ya’akov, did the brothers convey their apology. By saying what had remained unsaid until that point, the brothers and Yosef were able to reconcile. They asked for forgiveness and Yosef forgave them. At the end of Genesis, the relationship between Yosef and his brothers is finally repaired. Thus, the double-passage of forgiveness is not a repetition but a story of deepening forgiveness, moving from forgoing to forgiving.

We can ask why doublets are problematic at all. Why should we assume that ancient writing styles would avoid telling stories that seem relatively similar? Indeed, familiarity can help people remember the stories and recognize the differences. In the case of forgiveness, we see that there is no repetition at all but merely the careful development of the narrative and the slow process of reconciliation between Yosef and his brothers.

Articles of Faith is available on Amazon here.

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