Moshe's prophecy: an incomprehensible comprehension

At the conclusion of Parashat Beha’alotecha the Torah emphasises the gulf between ‘standard’ prophecy and the form received by Moshe. Prophecy in general, and the supremacy of Moshe’s perception of the divine word in particular, features strongly in all of Rambam’s primary works as he explores the precise nature of this ‘meeting of minds’ between the human and divine realm.

Rambam describes several unique features of Moshe’s prophecy, most importantly that he received God’s message directly (“panim e l panim”) rather than by means of an ‘angelic intermediary’. This direct intellectual encounter with the divine intellect granted Moshe a precise comprehension (“temunat Hashem yabit”) as opposed to the “riddles” and “dreams” that regular prophets were required to interpret. As we analyse in Judaism Reclaimed, Rambam understood the distinctive nature of Moshe’s prophecy – like all variations in prophetic ability – to be a result of his supremely balanced character traits. Each imbalanced trait is understood to create an additional “mechitzah” which impedes the prophet’s perception of God’s word. Moshe’s superior prophecy resulted from his success in perfecting all of his traits and thus removing all barriers to his comprehension.

While this explanation provides an understanding of Moshe’s distinct prophecy which is consistent with Rambam’s more rationalist natural approach to prophecy, it produces a number of further difficulties:

How are we to understand Rambam’s claim that Moshe had completely perfected his character traits? The biblical text openly discloses instances where Moshe appears to have fallen short – most notably in his anger with the people and in his lack of trust in God. Rabbinic commentaries typically expand upon these shortcomings, detailing their impact upon his ability to transmit God’s word (according to Vayikra Rabbah 13:1, three laws were hidden from Moshe, corresponding to three occasions on which he lost his temper). Can it be argued from Rambam’s perspective that these instances were all somehow justifiable? Or otherwise temporary aberrations that were not part of Moshe’s core personality? Perhaps the fact that he was “more humble than any man” meant that his personality could be completely negated and any imbalances therefore not encroach upon his intellect’s perception of God’s word?

A further question can be asked from within Rambam’s own writings. We read in Hilchot Teshuvah that all people have the ability to become “great like Moshe our teacher”. Does that mean that others can, in theory, reach his level of character perfection and, with it, prophetic perfection? If this is correct, then might the Torah’s statement -- that no prophet will arise like Moshe -- rely upon divine interference in (what Rambam regards to be) the broadly natural phenomenon of prophecy?

The discussion thus far has focused on the distinct nature of Moshe’s prophecy primarily from Rambam’s teachings in Mishneh Torahand various parts of his Commentary on the Mishnah. As is so often the case, the matter becomes significantly more complicated once we include the relevant passages of Moreh Nevuchim with its uniquely peculiar intrigue and dynamic.

Our previous post touched upon the subject of how deliberate contradictions within the Moreh are to be interpreted. The nature of Moshe’s prophecy offers another apparent example of this phenomenon, with Leo Strauss highlighting how Rambam first states that the Moreh will not discuss the nature of Moshe’s prophecy before making several considerable mentions of it in the subsequent chapters. Consistent with his broader approach to interpreting the Moreh, Strauss argues that this constitutes a ‘contradiction’ which indicates that Rambam did not truly subscribe to the ‘necessary religious belief’ of distinct Mosaic prophecy. According to this approach, the contradiction is a subtle esoteric signal to the sophisticated reader that in truth there is no superior ‘Mosaic’ religious teaching which can raise revelation over rational truth.

As in our previous post, Strauss’s theory is challenged by Prof. Marvin Fox in Interpreting Maimonides. Fox argues, among other points, that Rambam does not explain anything positive and substantial about the actual nature and functioning of Moshe’s unique prophecy. Rather, Rambam limits himself in these chapters to using Moshe’s ‘purely intellectual’ form of prophecy as a point of contrast to regular prophecy. Perhaps Rambam means to convey to his readers that – in keeping with other complex components of the Maimonidean system – we are forced to accept our inability to fathom the inner workings of Mosaic prophecy. We are unable to explain how Moshe’s unimpeded intellectual perception of divine truths is translated into precise biblical laws and words – including numerous anthropomorphic and other metaphors which appear to bear the hallmark of the imaginative faculties rather than the pure intellect. Ultimately, the most meaningful statements we can make about it are negative, such as that it does not involve the imagination or angelic intermediaries.

First posted to Facebook 11 June 2020, here.

Rosh Hashanah and the philosophical challenges of petitonary prayer

 In conversation with Rabbi David Silverstein

In a few short days, most of us will be gearing up for our biggest ‘’Prayer-thon” of the year. But how much time have we spent thinking about what prayer is and how it works?

• Are we somehow attempting to change God’s mind through our prayers?
• To persuade Him to through our words and feelings to improve our lot in the coming year?
• Can our words and thoughts really impact the fortunes of others we look to pray for?

In this conversation with Rabbi David Silverstein of Yeshivat Orayta, we explore the thoughts of Rambam, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch and Rabbi Yosef Albo among others as to the function and mechanism of petitionary prayer. What are the relative advantages of each of these approaches and how can we combine and draw upon all of them to enrich our prayers this Rosh Hashanah?

First posted on Facebook 15 September 2020, here.

Yom Kippur musings: Rambam's Hilchot Teshuvah and powerful prooftexts

 One of the central texts traditionally studied at this time of year is Rambam’s Hilchot Teshuvah: a supreme arrangement of traditional teachings on repentance, often through a Maimonidean perspective of the soul and Divine justice. Surprisingly little attention tends to be paid, however, to Rambam’s often peculiar choice of verses apparently cited in support of his teachings. I would like to present a couple of brief examples of the profound significance contained within some of these often skipped over features.

At the start of the third chapter of Hilchot Teshuvah, Rambam presents what appears to be a highly simplistic model of God’s justice system:

Each and every person has merits and sins. A person whose merits exceed his sins is righteous. A person whose sins exceed his merits is] wicked. If [his sins and merits] are equal, he is termed a Beinoni….If a person's sins exceed his merits, he will immediately die because of his wickedness as [Jeremiah 30:14] states: "for the multitude of your transgressions".

So simplistic is Rambam’s teaching, that Ra’avad jumps in with the obvious objection: we surely see plenty of wicked people living long lives. It may be instructive however to read Rambam’s teaching – including his non-obvious prooftext – in light of Rambam’s definition of “life” and “death” from Moreh Nevuchim (1:42).

There Rambam demonstrates that, in addition to their literal renderings, the terms “life” and “death” are commonly used in both biblical and rabbinic sources to refer to the acquisition of wisdom (and desirable character traits). On this basis, the sages teach “the righteous even in their death are considered alive” since they have acquired the means to maintain a connection to God, while “the wicked in their lifetime are called dead” since they lack such a connection.

The verse in Jeremiah cited by Rambam to support his teaching refers to the Jewish nation at its lowest ebb being forgotten and abandoned because of its mass of sins. This verse does not refer to literal death, but rather to a suspension of the nation’s special providential relationship with God as a result of sin (see Abarbanel among others). It can be suggested therefore, that Rambam’s choice of prooftext is subtly alluding to the metaphorical connotation of death. If this is true, it would seem that Rambam would explain aggadic teachings and prayers in the Yom Kippur liturgy to be referring to those “written in the book” of true life – ie connection to God – or true death – the lack of such a connection.

Another example of the profound nature of Rambam’s prooftexts can be found in the same passage. Rambam writes that:

This reckoning is not calculated [only] on the basis of the number of merits and sins, but also their magnitude. There are some merits which outweigh many sins as implied by [I Kings 14:13]: "Because in him, there was found something good."

While, as Rambam continues to explain, we cannot fathom God’s divine system of accounting and justice his astonishing choice of prooftext does afford us a degree of insight. Out of all of the biblical examples of righteous actions and praiseworthy deeds, Rambam highlights the actions of Aviyah, son of Yeravam. A man who is condemned to a premature death along with the rest of the wicked and idolatrous royal family. The biblical text does not reveal the nature of this “something good” through which Aviyah alone merited a respectable death and burial. The Talmud however informs us that Aviyah removed the armed guards who had been stationed to prevent pilgrims from the Northern Kingdom from traveling to the Beit Hamikdash.

Providing broader context, the political and religious legitimacy of Yeravam’s regime relied on the fact that his subjects would no longer admire and look to the Davidic leadership for guidance. Aviyah’s willingness to remove the guards and make it easier for people to travel to the Mikdash thus represented significant personal sacrifice. He was, in effect, putting his own royal position and legitimacy at risk by allowing access to Jerusalem.

What Rambam appears to be indicating through his prooftext is that, while we are capable of measuring and comparing the objectiveworth of the mitzvot, the degree of effort and self-sacrifice that a person injects into any good deed can cause it to outweigh many other merits.

[This second example was heard from Rabbi Lippa Rabinowitz]

G’mar Chatima Tova. An easy and meaningful fast to all.

First posted to Facebook 26September 2020, here.

A Jew for all seasons: does Judaism need synagogues?

 The peculiarities of Yomim Noraim services during the Covid-19 era have led many to re-evaluate their relationship with shul on the High Holy Days (“Weren’t shorter brighter services a breath of fresh air this year? Can they perhaps be similarly adapted on a more regular basis?”). Writing two centuries ago in Germany, Rabbi S. R. Hirsch had his own deep reservations about the nature of the Yomim Noraim services and, particularly, the impression of Judaism that they left less traditional Jews with.

For R’ Hirsch the phenomenon of Jews who only visited the Synagogue three days a year (or for formal rites of passage) was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, even this partial acquaintance has gratifying effects of demonstrating and enhancing Jewish identity and continuity. Nevertheless:

this sporadic relationship with Judaism has an exceptionally troublesome effect for it is limited to special times and occasions. If for a period of years our sole contact with Jewish institutions is limited to Rosh Hashanah or the Day of Atonement, and we behold Judaism only in the white vestments of the dead, then our relationship with Judaism dissipates even before we reach the happy festival of the booths and the happy Torah-celebration…the poetry of Judaism becomes reduced to eulogies and confessions of sin – and everything about Judaism becomes so bleak that we are unable to use it in our bright, fresh, happy, pulsating lives.

Judaism is a splendid life symphony of the times of the year, of which Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are only solemn introductions…the Jewish veneration of God does not peak with the Rosh Hashanah mood. God seeks the joyful sound of the soul…the joyous Sukkoth festival.

R’ Hirsch teaches that Judaism is about infusing our lives with meaning and vibrancy. Living and celebrating the Torah’s moral, spiritual and intellectual teachings. While the High Holy Days perform a crucial function of directing us to focus inwards and reassess our life goals and direction, it is the joyous festival of Sukkot which is more quintessentially ‘’Jewish’’ than the austere and intimidating aura prevalent in many Synagogues on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur.

This essay got me thinking: how applicable are R’ Hirsch’s observations in today’s generation? My impression of less observant Jews is that their Judaism certainly contains more positive elements than what R’ Hirsch describes. These may include identifying with or advocacy for Israel, Chanukah parties and communal social activities. Although I have also read about how a not-insignificant part of Jewish identity – particularly in the previous generation – lurks in the dark shadow of the Holocaust and national suffering.

In truth however, R’ Hirsch’s broader message is applicable just as much to fully observant Orthodox Jews – and perhaps particularly to them. A related teaching of R’ Hirsch implores his readers not to imagine that Judaism is primarily concentrated in the solemn confines of synagogues and study halls. Rather its moral and spiritual teachings must infuse and guide our every thought and action. How we conduct ourselves in the streets outside of the synagogues, how we interact with those around us in our lives – and particularly in our own homes. We must uncompromisingly reject the unspoken notion that regular attendance in Shul and Yom Kippur chest-beating somehow furnishes us with a “Get Out Of Fail Free” card which excuses undesirable behaviour at other times.

This year’s abrupt and painful shock to Jewish observance and communal prayer provides us a rare opportunity to re-evaluate not the length of our services nor the tunes of our Chazzan. But rather the relative degrees of importance that we place on the Synagogue within our broader Jewish lives, and on the solemn meditations of the Yomim Noraim versus a year-long embodiment of the Torah’s moral, spiritual and intellectual riches.

First posted to Facebook 30 September 2020, here.

Judaism Demystified: A Podcast for the Perplexed

I'm excited to share this link to the highly recommended podacst Judaism Demystified: A Podcast for the Perplexed which I joined recently for an episode to discuss the opening section of "Talmud Reclaimed."

Join us as we explore the current state of Halakha and the subconscious reverence for the Halakhic status quo. We discuss the pivotal role of the Sanhedrin in the Halakhic system, explaining why without it, we find ourselves in a "Halakhic Exile." We examine the binding nature and legislative scope of the Talmud, and the nuanced two-tiered Halakhic system as described by Rambam.

Also explored in this episode is my innovative interpretation of Taamei HaMitzvot (Reasons for the Commandments) in the Moreh HaNevukhim, critiquing the approach of Professor Christine Hayes, and how his legal system addresses the Havat Yair's problem of the existence of dispute in a system which requires faith in the effective transmission of Torah over thousands of years.

As we navigate the complexities of Torah law derivation and its perceived independence from God's will, we also explore why intricate debates and extensive Talmudic focus are essential - even within Rambam's approach to Talmud and Halakha.

Finally, we probe which aspects of biblical law have the potential for alteration, leaving us with a deeper understanding of Halachic evolution and its implications.

Tune in for a compelling conversation that challenges conventional perspectives and provides invaluable insights for those seeking a deeper understanding of Talmud.

This can also be listened to on Spotify (together with an Intro) here.

Please share this with anyone who may find it interesting!

First posted to Facebook 21 July 2024, here.

God only knows? Divine knowledge according to Rambam, Ralbag and Ibn Ezra

Guest post by Rabbi Dr Benjamin Elton, Chief Minister of The Great Synagogue, Sydney

The thorny theological challenge of relating to Divine knowledge – in particular as it can be reconciled with the doctrine of human free will – features in several chapters of Judaism Reclaimed. Perhaps the most radical position to be found in Jewish tradition is that of Ralbag (Gersonides), who concludes that God’s knowledge relates to “universals” of the various species but not to details – including details of specific human actions. Ralbag, writing in Book 3 of Milchamot Hashem, further claims that this was also the view of the famed Spanish sage Abraham Ibn Ezra.

When the Torah in this week’s parashah records God as saying “I will descend now and see, whether according to her cry, which has come to Me, they have done; [I will wreak] destruction [upon them]; and if not, I will know.”, Ibn Ezra appears to comment that God’s knowledge relates only to generalities (the Avi Ezer super-commentary by Rabbi Shlomo HaKohen of Lissa disputes this interpretation of Ibn Ezra’s words).

My intention here is not to advance the approach of Ralbag, which is certainly an outlier in Jewish thought, but rather to highlight the implications for our assessment of Rambam who people too-often attempt to characterise as a radical Aristotelian who allowed his Greek philosophy to dictate to his interpretations of the Torah. It is important to see how other Jewish thinkers of his era described him in this matter. Ralbag writes:

“It seems that Maimonides’ position on this question of Divine cognition is not implied by any philosophical principles; indeed, reason denies this view, as I will show. It seems rather that theological considerations have forced him to this view.”

In the essay below, Rabbi Dr Elton provides a fascinating insight into just how far Rambam strayed from Aristotelian thought on the subject of Divine knowledge. He explains in the process why it was repeated in Hilchot Teshuvah, despite having already been included in Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah where Rambam addresses the nature of the universe.

How does God think? Understanding Rambam H. Teshuva 5:5

I want to examine a passage in the Rambam’s Mishneh Torah which is regularly read and almost never understood. In the middle of Rambam’s Laws of Repentance he takes a philosophical detour and asks how it is possible to reconcile Divine foreknowledge with human free will. If God knows what we are going to do, how can we have the ability to choose whether to do it or not. Rambam answers:

Know, that the answer to this question is longer in measure than the earth and broader than the sea, and many great elements and ranking mountains are suspended thereon; but it is essential that you know this fundamental matter which I outline. In the second chapter of the treatise of Fundamentals of the Torah (2:9-10) it was already elucidated that the Holy One, blessed is He does not know of things with a knowledge which exists outside of Himself, like, for instance, people do, for they and their knowledge are two separate things; but, He, may His Name be exalted and his knowledge are One, and it is not within the power of the knowledge of man to attain this matter clearly, and even as it is not within the power of man to attain and find the truth of the Creator…

This being so, it is not within our intellectual power to know in what manner the Holy One, blessed is He knows all the creatures and their actions, but we do know without a doubt that man's behaviour is in the hand of man, and that the Holy One, blessed is He neither draws him nor issues edicts against him to do as he does. And, not solely because of having accepted the religion do we know that there is no predestination, but even by clear evidence of the words of wisdom. Because thereof it is said in prophecy that man is judged for his actions according to his actions, whether they be good or evil, and this is the very foundation upon which all the words of prophecy depend.

This is a difficult and perplexing passage. As Ra'avad noted, and protested against, Rambam’s explanation does not answer the question, it just raises a philosophical idea that by Rambam’s own admission no one can understand. Further, what is it doing in H. Teshuvah, especially when Rambam has already explained it earlier in the Mishneh Torah, in H. Yesodei HaTorah?

To understand this we have to look at the Aristotelian aspects of Rambam’s epistemology, and its connection with his theology. Aristotle (at least as understood in the Arabic philosophical tradition that Rambam inherited) saw that there was movement in the world and therefore posited a first mover which causes all the other movement. This mover (a sort of Aristotelian god) is entirely passive, eternal and perfect. As all things move towards perfection they are moving towards this first mover, which is the cause of all movement in the world. Part of its perfection is omniscience, but it is omniscience of a very particular type. It only knows universals, that is to say, the concept of a horse or a table. It does not know about particular horses and tables.

In that way, its knowledge is just like our knowledge, because our knowledge is also limited to the concepts of things but does not encompass the things themselves. Let us take an example. I have knowledge about horses in general, and I know some specific things about particular horses. But I don’t know everything about horses in general, or anything at all about every single horses that exists: everything they have ever done, and certainly not everything they will ever do. Furthermore, the knowledge I possess of these horses exists only in my head. I have taken sense data I have picked up in my encounters with horses, abstracted from that data and thereby created a piece of knowledge that resides inside my mind. What I know about horses is an abstract derived from all the data I have derived from real horses, that has been processed by my mind and exists in my mind. Thus in the case of myself and horses, and indeed every piece of knowledge that I have, the thing being thought about, the process of thinking, and the thinker, are all one. This is equally true of the Aristotelian first mover and of people.

But Rambam says explicitly that God and people do not think in the same way. That is because Rambam believes that God has knowledge that the Aristotelian first mover does not have. God knows every particular. What is more (and this is totally incomprehensible) God even has ‘knowledge’ of material things. That is an absurd concept to us, because a physical object cannot get into our minds. The idea of something exists in our mind, but obviously not the thing itself, that remains outside our mind. By contrast, all spiritual and material things exist in the mind of God. Indeed, they only exist at all because they exist in God’s mind. God did not acquire knowledge of them (if God ever acquired knowledge that would imply a change in God, and that is impossible), they exist because God ‘knows’ them. If that does not make sense to us, we should not be surprised. Rambam says explicitly that the human mind is incapable of comprehending such a notion. Therefore, while we and our knowledge are not one, because the horse or the table remains outside our minds, they are not outside the mind of God, because God and God’s knowledge are absolutely one. It is not within our ability to understand that concept, but it remains true.

Rambam expressed this in the Guide for the Perplexed (3:21)

Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not derived from the things themselves; if this were the case, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge; on the contrary, the things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge, which has established their actual properties, and made part of them purely spiritual, another part material and constant as regards its individual members, a third part material and changeable as regards the individual beings according to eternal and constant laws. Plurality, acquisition, and change in His knowledge is therefore impossible. He fully knows His unchangeable essence, and has thus a knowledge of all that results from any of His acts. If we were to try to understand in what manner this is done, it would be the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to make our knowledge identical with His knowledge.

We can now see why Rambam included this point in H. Teshuvah 5:5. It is not an attempt at an answer at all, rather it is sharpening the question. It is easily possible to reconcile human free will with the sort of omniscience Aristotle’s first mover has. But the omniscience of God as Rambam understands it, seems totally incompatible, yet Rambam assures us that it remains the case. He tells us that it is ‘essential’ that we know that God’s knowledge of every details of past, present and future is absolute, and yet as he says at the end of the halakhah (in a statement which flows perfectly logically from what has come before) people have complete free will and are judged according to their exercise of it. That is why this brief discussion is repeated in H. Teshuvah, because it is the central concept that makes teshuvah compatible with Rambam’s concept of God.

I am grateful to the scholars I discussed this question with, especially Dr Daniel Davis.

First posted to Facebook 5 November 2020, here.