The legitimacy of the sages and Sanhedrin to rule upon and interpret Torah law has been a point of controversy for over 2,000 years. Josephus describes for us the deep divide between the priestly-aristocratic Sadducees, who did not follow received traditions, and the Pharisees with their oral tradition.
Rabbi D. Z. Hoffman argued that this debate over transmitted tradition and judicial interpretation of the Torah was only a small part of a bigger societal rift which was caused by the introduction of Hellenist influences into the Jewish world:
By relieving [the Jews] of all obligations placed on the people by the Sophrim, they [the Sadducees] permitted a freer life and thus were more appealing to the great and powerful than the strict Phariseeism. [The Highest Court pp174-5]
Taking a step back, what can we understand from the Torah’s text itself about what it envisages to be its legitimate mode of interpretation?
We read in last week’s parashah how, in the aftermath of the splitting of the sea, God communicated a set of laws for the nation to observe. These laws, which are traditionally understood to encompass Shabbat and civil laws, appear to have occupied the people greatly. When Yitro visits the nation he observes that they were coming to Moshe “from morning until evening” in order to receive legal guidance and judgment.
Regardless of how clear and comprehensive any legal teaching may be, it will always in practice generate novel cases and borderline scenarios that trigger legitimate debate as to the correct application of the law. Torah law, like all other legal systems, therefore required a system of judicial determination in order to clarify and develop the divine law and assist its application to new situations. Near the start of the 40-year sojourn in the desert, Yitro oversaw the establishing of a hierarchical judicial system for this very purpose: to clarify and rule upon new or complex legal challenges:
And they shall judge the people at all times, and it shall be that any major matter they shall bring to you, and they themselves shall judge every minor matter…
And they would judge the people at all times; the difficult case they would bring to Moses, but any minor case they themselves would judge.
At this early stage in Jewish legal history, the presence of an authenticated prophet with a divine hotline meant that there was no question as to the authority or accuracy of the laws which were being taught and clarified at the top of this system.
Later on the Plains of Moav, however, with Moshe contemplating his own imminent death and the nation’s turbulent transition from a miraculous desert existence to a sovereign nation in Israel, it was apparent that a significant judicial adjustment would be required. At this point, Moshe presented the divine command for a supreme court of Jewish law—a Beit Din HaGadol which would replace him at the top of the desert hierarchy. Instead of difficult cases being brought to him, as had been the practice up until this point, they would now be sent to the Sanhedrin in its chambers at the Mikdash.
If a matter is impossible for you in judgment, between blood and blood, between judgment and judgment, or between affliction and affliction, words of dispute in your cities, then you shall rise and go up to the place the Lord, your God, chooses. And you shall come to the kohanim-levi’im and to the judge who will be in those days, and you shall inquire, and they will tell you the words of judgment.
In the absence of Moshe’s clear divine mandate to define and elucidate the commandments, this supreme court needed to be unambiguously invested with biblical authority to rule:
And you shall do according to the word they tell you, from the place the Lord will choose, and you shall observe to do according to all they rule for you. According to the law they rule for you and according to the judgment they say to you, you shall do; you shall not stray from the word they tell you, either right or left. And the man who acts intentionally, not obeying the kohen who stands there to serve the Lord, your God, or to the judge. That man shall die, and you shall abolish evil from Israel.
On this basis, the Torah is understood to have invested this court, which replaces Moshe as the supreme legal authority, with standing both to transmit the known body of laws and to issue rulings which can further clarify and define the Torah’s meaning and legal details.
According to Rambam’s understanding, the court has jurisdiction to rule and legislate concerning any of the finer details of biblical law that were not taught explicitly at Sinai (see further in my third essay in this Judaism Reclaimed sample - https://judaismreclaimed.com/sample/). This is seemingly a consequence of the verse framing the court’s role as “If a matter is impossible (ki yipoleh) for you in judgment” – laws which are clearly contained within the transmitted meaning of the text would appear to lie beyond the court’s jurisdiction. With regard to other details of law, however, a properly constituted Sanhedrin is granted a power of hora’ah (asher yorucha) through which they can interpret and define terms of the Torah’s text in order to legitimately clarify and determine details of Torah law.
First posted on Facebook 5 February 2023, here.
